The Security Violation of the CenturyThoughts from a Marine who used to oversee security investigations
The SECDEF’s Chief of Staff just announced that the Pentagon is going all in to investigate unauthorized disclosures of national security information . And that those found responsible will “be referred to the appropriate criminal law enforcement entity for criminal prosecution.” They are pulling out all the stops, even bringing in the polygraphers and lie detectors(!), to make sure a leak like this never happens again. That’s right, folks, the full weight of the US government is going to ensure that reports of Elon Musk’s next China brief will not be leaked. Wait. Wait wait wait. You thought I was referring to that leak? The one where the Vice President, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, and others purportedly brought a journalist into their war room decision-making and intel discussing chat? Alright, fine, I guess if you think that that situation is somehow more serious than the crime of telling a reporter that Elon Musk was going to get a Pentagon brief, I guess we can talk about that one instead. Before we get started, everybody is kind of doing the “but her e-mails” thing, so I want to give you a different and unique perspective. I used to oversee Marine Special Operations Command’s entire investigations portfolio. Hundreds of investigations, all over the world, and many of them were investigations into the mishandling of classified information, or “spillage,” as we call it. Here are some insights into the situation from my background. When I was leading missions outside the wire in Iraq, and then a part of operations and strikes in Afghanistan, all of our movements and actions were considered classified. Our maps, our timelines, our routes, the number of personnel, the intel that backed it up, all of that stuff. We were especially careful regarding intelligence gathering, the intelligence itself, the sources that gave us information, and the entire targeting process. That stuff was always classified and only given out on a need to know basis. And if you didn’t follow the rules and someone found out, you were investigated and prosecuted or fired. We investigated people for taking home paper power-point slides to work on and bring back to the office the next day. We investigated people for forgetting maps or slide decks in their cargo pockets. We investigated people for accidentally putting CD’s (this was the old days) with classified information into unclassified computers. The US government not only investigated, but ruined careers over these types of things. Not because the acts were evil. In fact, in a lot of cases, people were taking work home in order to be better at their jobs (which is maybe kind of what happened with this Yemen Signal chat), or they were just accidents as a result of failing to follow procedure (which clearly happened in this Signal chat). Regardless, however, the government always investigated the situation in order to ensure that the correct processes are in place to protect classified information, and always took action against the violators in order to remind people that the process must be respected, regardless of intent. Because the process is what keeps accidents from happening. Col Waltz, LtCol Gabbard, Major Hegseth, and Corporal Vance all would have known that. In fact if they were still in uniform, they may have even received an email from higher, like some servicemembers apparently did, right around the time of this incident telling them not to use the commercial app they were using, Signal, for even sensitive unclassified information, much less secret or top secret info. Likewise, if these officials were still in uniform, at minimum they would all be subject to a massive investigation, have their security clearances immediately suspended, and would likely never get them back. There is also a good chance they would have been prosecuted or separated from military service with bad paper, although it’s hard to tell for sure without knowing exactly what was in the texts. Nevertheless, the irony of seeing the phrase “We are currently clean on OPSEC” in a Signal chat that inadvertently included a reporter is truly remarkable for someone like me who used to work these issues. Another wild part of this whole thing from my experience overseeing investigations and advising the government in situations like this is the ‘no harm, no foul’ defense put forth by the National Security Council: “The ongoing success of the Houthi operation demonstrates that there were no threats to our servicemembers or our national security.” If that’s the new standard, then I can think of dozens of servicemembers who would like their records corrected, their ranks reinstated, and their backpay, because I don’t remember any direct harm to America from any of the investigations I oversaw. What I do remember were a lot of regular people failing to follow the rules or disregarding processes and those actions leading to spillage of classified information—none of which was even close to as sensitive as giving the time, location, and names of individual targets to an uncleared person, much less a journalist. And I remember the government vigorously defending the rules and process because when the process and rules are ignored, accidents happen. It would be literally impossible, for example, to add a journalist’s number to a secure system. Which is why the system is in place. Take that for what it is worth on this Tuesday evening and draw your own conclusions. A big thanks to everyone for your ongoing support and continuing to read and share this Substack. Lucas The views expressed in this Substack are those of the individual only and not those of the Department of Defense. Use of military rank, job titles, and photographs in uniform do not imply endorsement by the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense. You're currently a free subscriber to Lucas’s Substack. For the full experience, upgrade your subscription.
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Tuesday, March 25, 2025
The Security Violation of the Century
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